Error Detection and Recovery for Transient Faults in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems by Abdulaziz Alkhoraidly & M. Anwar Hasan
Error Detection and Recovery for Transient Faults
in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
Abdulaziz Alkhoraidly and M. Anwar Hasan
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering
University of Waterloo
January 20, 2009
Abstract
Faults can corrupt data in storage, in transit, or during a computation. Like other digital
systems, cryptosystems are vulnerable to natural and artiﬁcial faults. However, the eﬀects of
faults on cryptosystems far suppress the corruption of data. Attacks that exploit various classes
of faults to learn secret data have been proposed and shown to be practical. As such, eﬃcient
detection and recovery of errors resulting from faults have a growing importance in the design
of cryptosystems.
We tackle the problem of error detection and recovery for transient faults in elliptic curve
scalar multiplication structures. We propose the use of frequent validation with partial re-
computation during the scalar multiplication for more eﬃcient error detection and recovery. In
our approach, the scalar multiplication iterations are grouped into blocks and eﬃcient error
detection schemes are used to detect errors early, which signiﬁcantly limits the propagation of
corrupted data. Moreover, we use the same error detection schemes, combined with partial re-
computation, to achieve eﬃcient error recovery without requiring complete time and hardware
redundancy. Our analysis illustrates that these modiﬁcations enable considerably more eﬃcient
and reliable structures relative to known error detection and recovery designs.
1 Introduction
The reliability of digital systems is among the important evaluation criteria, and in some cases the
single most important. The existence of undetected faults in medical, military and transportation
applications can cause great loss in lives, while undetected faults in ﬁnancial application can cause
great monetary losses. As such, fault tolerance has been among the key design criteria of critical
systems, and research has been intensive in developing reliable schemes for error control with
minimal eﬀects on performance and cost.
Like other digital systems, cryptosystems are vulnerable to faults of many types. In addition
to the data corruption that these faults may cause, attacks have been devised to exploit faults and
undermine the security of cryptosystems. Some of these attacks have been demonstrated to be
practical. For each of the known fault attacks, countermeasures have been introduced to detect
corresponding errors and prevent the resulting information leakage. Moreover, various forms of
redundancy have been employed to recover from errors so the system will output the correct result
despite the existence of faults.
1In general, all computations performed between the occurrence of an error and its detection are
corrupted and their results should be discarded. This loss can be reduced by frequent validation of
the state of the computation. This may increase the cost in terms of validation tests, but in most
conditions, especially in the case of frequent errors or fault-based attacks, this increase is balanced
or outweighed by the reduced cost of corrupted computations.
In this work, we propose the use of frequent validation for error detection and recovery in ellip-
tic curve scalar multiplication structures. In our approach, we partition the scalar multiplication
iterations into blocks, and use simple and eﬃcient error detection schemes to detect errors early and
reduce the loss due to corrupted computations. Moreover, we use error detection schemes combined
with partial re-computation to achieve eﬃcient and reliable error recovery without requiring full
time and hardware redundancy. Our analysis illustrates that designs employing frequent valida-
tion are considerably more eﬃcient and reliable than earlier error detection and recovery designs
especially when errors are frequent or in the case of fault attacks.
This document is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the types and causes of faults in
digital systems and addresses known fault attacks on elliptic curve scalar multiplication. It also
reviews the reported error detection and fault-tolerant structures for elliptic curve cryptosystems.
Sections 3 and 4 discuss the use of frequent validation to achieve eﬃcient error detection and
recovery and analyze the performance and reliability advantages. Section 5 provides a summary
and discusses future work.
2 Faults, Fault Attacks and Countermeasures
Unlike the direct attacks on the cryptographic algorithms, Side-Channel Attacks (SCA) target
the implementation of a cryptosystems by exploiting the information leaking during the proper or
improper use of the cryptosystem. An SCA can be passive, where the attacker only observes a
working cryptosystem, or active, where the attacker actively attempts to inﬂuence the running of
the cryptosystem.
Fault attacks on cryptosystems belong to the category of active SCAs and describe a family of
attacks where an attacker injects faults into the cryptosystem and uses the resulting faulty results,
in addition to the correct result, to discover the secret information partially or fully.
In this section, we give an overview of the causes and types of faults in digital systems and discuss
known ways to counter these faults. Then, we examine the known fault attacks on elliptic curve
cryptosystems and discuss their countermeasures. Moreover, we review existing error detection and
fault-tolerant designs for elliptic curve cryptosystems.
2.1 Faults in Digital Systems
In general, it is important for a digital system to be fault-free and consistently give the correct
results. Faults can occur for a variety of natural and artiﬁcial reasons, and ways have been proposed
to counter their eﬀect on the performance of the system.
Error detection and fault tolerance are even more important for cryptosystems, due to the
existence of fault attacks that use faulty results to discover secret information and threat the
security of the whole system. In this section, we brieﬂy review the causes and types of faults, and
the general hardware and software countermeasures to faults in digital systems.
22.1.1 Causes of Faults
Faults can occur in a device either intentionally or unintentionally, and can be caused by one of
many reasons:
1. Variations in standard operation conditions can be used eﬀectively to inject faults in a system.
For example:
(a) The variation in supply voltage can disrupt the execution and cause the processor to
skip instructions.
(b) The variation in the clock frequency, especially for external clocks, can disrupt in-
put/output operations or cause the processor to miss instructions. Moreover,
(c) Exposing the device to temperatures outside its operational range can cause random
modiﬁcations of the memory and inconsistencies in memory access.
2. Exposure to light and condensed beams: These methods exploit the photoelectric eﬀects
which are inherent in all electric circuits. The exposures to photons induces currents in the
circuit that can be used to disrupt the normal operation. Moreover, the targeting and timing
can be made more precise by using lasers in fault injection. It is also possible to inject faults
in packaged circuits without removing the packaging by using X-rays and ion beams.
2.1.2 Types of Faults
Faults in electronic circuits can either be permanent or transient. Permanent faults are caused by
intentional or unintentional defects in the chip. As the name indicates, they have a permanent
eﬀect on the behavior of the circuit. Permanent faults can be divided into the following classes:
1. Single event burn-out faults.
2. Single event snap back faults.
3. Single event latch-up faults.
4. Total dose rate faults.
On the other hand, a transient fault does not cause a permanent change in the behavior of the
circuit. Such faults are caused by local ionization that induces a current which can be misinterpreted
by the circuit as an internal signal. Transient faults can be divided into the following classes:
1. Single event upsets.
2. Multiple event upsets.
3. Dose rate faults.
More information on the diﬀerent types of faults can be found in [5].
32.1.3 Statistical Modeling of Faults
Modeling the occurrence of faults in a system is important in estimating their frequency and
eﬀects, and hence, in minimizing the cost incurred by error detection and fault tolerance schemes
by designing them accordingly. Reliability is usually modeled for single components in a system,
and then the results are used to estimate the reliability of the whole system.
An important parameter that describes the reliability of a component is its failure rate, denoted
by λ, which describes the expected number of failures per unit time for a component in a good
condition [8]. In general, components go through a period of high failure rate early in their lifetime,
the infant mortality phase. Then, their failure rate stabilizes for a considerable amount of time in
their operational phase. Towards the end of their operational lifetime, components usually display
increasing failure rates, the wear-out phase.
A model for reliability [8] Let T be a random variable that describes the time until a com-
ponent fails and let f(t) and F(t) denote the probability density function of T and its cumulative
distribution function, respectively. Then, the reliability of a component, denoted by R(t), is deﬁned
as the probability that the component will not fail before time t, i.e. R(t) = Pr(T > t).
It can be shown that, for a component in its operational phase, i.e. with a constant λ, the
lifetime of the component will follow an exponential distribution with parameter λ, so for t ≥ 0, we
have f(t) = λe−λt, F(t) = 1 − e−λt, and R(t) = e−λt. Moreover, the mean time to failure (MTTF)
is the expected value of T and is equal to 1
λ. Note that the exponential distribution is a memoryless
distribution, which means that for any real numbers t0 and t1, Pr(T > t1|T > t0) = Pr(T > t1−t0),
i.e. the distribution has no memory of earlier samples. In other words, time frames of equal length
have the same expected number of faults regardless of their position relative to t = 0.
When components are combined to make up a system, their individual reliabilities can be used
to estimate the reliability of the whole system based on the dependency relationships between the
components. It is usually assumed that components fail independently from each other [10], so the
reliability of the whole system can be derived using the probability rules for independent events.
2.1.4 Fault-tolerant Designs
Several solutions have been devised to avoid or detect faults, or detect the attempt to inject them.
Other solutions help to tolerate the occurrence of faults and produce correct results in spite of their
existence. Some of these methods are implemented in hardware while some can be implemented in
software or as a combination of the two.
The main countermeasure against faults and errors is the use of redundancy in the design. A
redundant design makes it possible to detect faulty results and behaviors. It also may permit the
recovery from faults.
The simplest form of redundancy is hardware redundancy, which entails replicating some part
of the hardware to prevent the existence of a single point of failure. Results produced by diﬀerent
modules are compared to detect faulty operation and, in certain cases, produce the correct result.
1. Static redundancy: In this type of hardware redundancy, one or more replica of the module are
run in parallel, and their results are compared to detect the existence of faults, and possibly
to conﬁrm the right result by a majority vote. Some examples of this type of redundancy are:
4block 1
input
block 2
compare result
error/no error
Figure 1: Double modular redundant structure
block 1
input
block 2
compare result
encode decode
error/no error
Figure 2: Double modular redundant structure with input coding
(a) Simple duplication: An example of simple duplication is double modular redundancy
(DMR) illustrated in Figure 1. DMR allows for detection of transient and permanent
faults provided that faults that occur in the two modules generate diﬀerent results.
However, when a fault occurs, this setup does not generally help in tolerating faults
unless there is a way to check whether a given result is the correct one.
A variant of this scheme involves encoding the input to one of the modules or both of
them in a way that allows getting the intended result by decoding the output of that
module, as illustrated in Figure 2. When this is applied, similar faults will generate dif-
ferent results, which helps in detecting them. The applicable encoding methods depend
on the characteristics of the computation and may include negation, swapping, shifting
and randomization [5].
(b) Multiple duplication: A common example of multiple redundancy is triple modular
redundancy (TMR) illustrated in Figure 3. The main advantage of TMR compared to
DMR is the possibility of tolerating faults through majority vote. A more general case
is the N-modular redundancy (NMR), shown in Figure 4, which gives higher reliability
but has a much higher cost. As before, it is possible to employ input encoding to get a
better error detection capability.
2. Dynamic redundancy: This type of redundancy is similar to the multiple redundancy dis-
cussed earlier with the main diﬀerence that the voting block is replaced with a switch that
is controlled by an error detection block, as illustrated in Figure 5. With exception of one
of the modules, designated as the main module, other replicas may be working in parallel or
turned oﬀ and used as spares when the main module fails.
3. Hybrid redundancy: Hardware redundancy can also be implemented as a hybrid of static and
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dynamic redundancy, with the possibility of using input encoding for added error detection
capability.
Another form of redundancy is time redundancy, which means repeating the computation or a
part of it to conﬁrm the earlier results and detect transient faults. Note that pure time redundancy
is not eﬀective to detect permanent faults that produce consistent errors.
1. Simple time redundancy: As illustrated in Figure 6, simple time redundancy involves the
repeating the operation using the same hardware module to detect any diﬀerence in the
results that may indicate the occurrence of a fault. This scheme can be made more sensitive
to faults by input encoding, as shown in Figure 7 due to the diﬃculty of injecting faults that
have the same eﬀects on two diﬀerent computations. The applicable encoding methods depend
on the characteristics of the computation and may include negation, swapping, shifting and
randomization [5]. However, like in the case of DMR, this setup does not generally help in
tolerating faults unless there is a way to check whether a given result is the correct one.
2. Multiple time redundancy: As an extension to simple time redundancy, multiple time redun-
dancy, illustrated in Figure 8, involves repeating the operations more that twice. This has
the potential of detecting errors and possibly correcting them. Also, input encoding can be
employed for more sensitive error detection.
A third form of redundancy is information redundancy, which is commonly employed in data
communication through error control codes. The principle behind information redundancy is the
use of more bits to represent the data than is actually necessary. This way, some of the representable
bit patterns don’t correspond to valid data and can be used to detect and correct errors. Some
examples of this type of redundancy are checksums and error detection and correction codes.
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It is also possible to combine two or more types of redundancy in a single scheme to get
the advantages of diﬀerent types of redundancy. One good example is error detection and fault
tolerance solutions for elliptic curve scalar multiplication where it is possible to combine all types
of redundancy, as we will discuss later.
Other countermeasures to fault injections that are commonly employed include:
1. Sensors and detectors: A variability in the operating environment can be detected using
suitable sensors. For example, a voltage detector can be used to ensure that the supply
voltage is within the operating range of the circuit.
2. Metal shields: Metal meshes can be used to cover the circuit, and can be either active or
passive. An active metal shield has data continuously passing in it to prevent probing and
to prevent exposing the circuit. A passive metal shield, on the other hand, doesn’t have any
data passing in it, but it helps by shielding the circuit and reducing the outgoing radiation.
3. Encryption: The communication between the processor and the memory, as well as the
memory contents and addressing, can be encrypted with changing keys to make it more
diﬃcult to target a certain memory location.
4. Unstable frequency generators: The use of unstable frequency generators makes it diﬃcult
for the attacker to synchronize with the device as every run will have diﬀerent timings.
5. Software baits: Small code fragments (baits) can be inserted into the software running on the
device to perform simple operations and validate the results to check the functional correctness
of the device.
6. Randomization: Injecting randomness into either the data to be processed or the order of
execution makes it diﬃcult for an attacker to target a certain instruction or variable. More-
over, some forms of data randomization don’t prevent the attack but rather mask the faulty
results so that they cannot be used by the attacker.
2.2 Fault Attacks on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
In general, fault tolerance is important for the correct functioning of all systems. However, it is
more essential for cryptosystems to take care of faults since their eﬀect may go beyond interrupting
8the functionality to threaten the security of the system by manipulating it to leak some of its secret
information. In this section, we discuss some of the known fault attacks that target elliptic curve
cryptosystems and their countermeasures.
2.2.1 Biehl-Meyer-M¨ uller Invalid Curve Attacks
In the attacks presented in [6], the representation of a point P on a strong elliptic curve E can be
modiﬁed, e.g. by a register fault, to move P to a diﬀerent, often weaker, curve E′. The resulting
incorrect output values can be used to ﬁnd possible intermediate values in the computation, which
reveals parts of the secret key. Usually, the attack has to be repeated since in many cases the value
guessed are not unique.
Basic attack Let E be a strong elliptic curve deﬁned over a ﬁnite ﬁeld K as
E : y2 + a1xy + a3y = x3 + a2x2 + a4x + a6
and let P and Q = kP be two points on E. To be able to mount this attack, suppose that the
device doesn’t check whether P and Q are actually on E.
According to the ANSI X9.63 and IEEE 1363 standards, a6 isn’t used in the addition operation.
It follows that for a point P′ = (x′,y′) with x′,y′ ∈ K and P′  ∈ E, the calculation of Q′ = kP′
occurs over the curve E′(a1,a2,a3,a4,a′
6) where
a′
6 = y′2 + a1x′y′ + a3y′ − x′3 − a2x′2 − a4x′
instead of the original curve E. If P′ is chosen in such a way that E′ is a cryptographically weak
curve, i.e. P′ has a relatively small order a over E′, then the value of k modulo a can be found be
solving a DLP over the subgroup of order a generated by P′. This process can be repeated until
suﬃcient residues of k are collected, and then CRT is used to calculate k. This attack runs in
polynomial time.
Exploiting early random register faults Now suppose that the device checks whether P lies
on E before starting the computation, and assume a single bit fault in an unknown position can
be injected right between the test and the computation. Again, the modiﬁed point P′ will lie on a
curve E′ with diﬀerent, yet unknown, a′
6 value.
Using the incorrect output Q′ = kP′, the value of a′
6 can be computed. For each of the possible
values of P′ that lie on E′, we ﬁnd k′ such that Q′ = k′P′ by solving a DLP on E′. Then, we
proceed to compute k as in the basic attack. This attack can be used to attack both the El Gamal
encryption and the ECDSA protocol in a sub-exponential running time.
Exploiting random faults during computation Assume that E is deﬁned over an extension
ﬁeld Fq such that E(Fq) contains a subgroup of prime order p with p > q/logq, and that the
binary algorithm is used to perform the scalar multiplication. Also, assume that the attacker can
repeatedly input a point P and induce a register fault during m successive iterations of computation,
and that the correct result Q = kP is known. Let Qi denote the values of Q before the i-th iteration.
During the computation, a fault is injected in a random iteration j to get Q′
j and eventually
Q′. Then, the values of Q, Q′ ,Qj and Q′
j can be used by successive guessing and reﬁnement to
discover the iteration j and an intermediate value Q′
j, which can be used to guess the higher n−j
9bits of k. Then the process can be repeated going downwards through the bits of k by inducing
new random faults in blocks of at most m consecutive iterations. The choice of the value of m
presents a trade-oﬀ between the number of register faults required and the time needed to analyze
the faulty results.
2.2.2 Ciet-Joye Invalid Curve Attacks
In the attacks presented in [9], the assumption that only a single or few bit errors can be injected
into the representation of P is relaxed. It also demonstrates how random errors in either the
representation of P, the curve parameters or the ﬁeld representation can allow for the recovery of
secret key either fully or partially.
Faults in base point Let E be an elliptic curve over K and let P = (xP,y) be the base point.
Faults can be assumed to occur in either or both of the coordinates of P. For example, assume
that the value stored for the x-coordinate, x′, is corrupted in some unknown bit positions and let
P′ = (x′,y). Then, Q′ = kP′ can be computed and will lie as before on the curve E′, which shares
all the parameters of E except a6. The corresponding value for E′, a′
6, can be computed from the
coordinates of Q′ as
a′
6 = y2
Q′ + a1xQ′yQ′ + a3yQ′ − x3
Q′ − a2x2
Q′ − a4xQ′
Then, we know that x′ is a root in K of
x3 + a2x2 + (a4 − a1y)x + (a′
6 − y2 − a3y)
since P′ ∈ E′.
Assuming that r, the order of P′ in E′, is small, the root of the above polynomial with the least
Hamming distance from the original xP can be used as a candidate for x′. Assuming that the DLP
on E′ is weak, the Pohlig-Hellman reduction can be used to obtain a candidate for k.
Faults in system parameters Faults can also be injected in the ﬁeld parameters, either in
storage or in transit. Let E be a curve deﬁned over a prime ﬁeld Fp of characteristics other than 2
and 3. In such a case, the equation of E can be simpliﬁed to y2 = x3 + ax + b. Assume that a bit
error is injected in p to give the almost similar value p′ and that all ﬁeld operations will then be
performed modulo p′ instead. In particular, the values of P, Q, a and b will be represented modulo
p′ as P′, Q′, a′ and b′, respectively.
Since Q′ satisﬁes the equation of E′, it follows that
b′ ≡ y′2
Q − x′3
Q − a′ ≡ b ≡ y2 − x3 − a mod p′
Hence, p′|D where D =
￿ ￿ ￿y′2
Q − x′3
Q − a′ − (y2 − x3 − a)
￿ ￿ ￿ and p′ can be revealed through factoring
D as the product of factors that has the shortest Hamming distance from p. Using these factors,
the value of k can be computed by solving a set of small DLPs and using the CRT. Faults in binary
ﬁelds representations and in other system parameters can be exploited in a similar way.
102.2.3 Sign-change Fault Attack
Earlier fault attacks on ECC worked by inducing faults in a way that would move the computation
to a diﬀerent (and probably weaker) elliptic curve. This can be achieved by either changing the base
point, an intermediate point, or a parameter of the curve. However, this can be easily countered
by checking that the result belongs to the original curve.
The attack described in [7] doesn’t move the computation to a diﬀerent curve, but rather results
in a faulty point on the original curve. By collecting enough of these faulty results, the secret can
be recovered in expected polynomial time.
It follows that point checking cannot be used to counter such attacks. Actually, it may help
the attacker to remove useless faulty points, i.e. points that fall oﬀ the curve, and hence it makes
a less precise attack more eﬀective. Randomization can be used as a countermeasure, but it is
not an acceptable solution in some implementation standards. However, the Montgomery scalar
multiplication that doesn’t use the y-coordinate is immune to such attack.
Attack description Basically, the attack involves changing the sign of an intermediate point in
the scalar multiplication algorithm. The sign change can happen uniformly in any iteration, and
the attacker doesn’t know the precise iteration in which the change happened.
The attack can be mounted on diﬀerent intermediate variables. For example, in a left-to-right
scalar multiplication algorithm, the attack can be applied to the doubling step, i.e. Qi = 2Qi+1. If
the sign of Qi is changed, the ﬁnal result would be ˜ Q = −Q+2Li(k), where Q is the correct result
and Li(k) is the product of P and the lowest i bits of k.
The idea is to recover the bits of k in blocks of 1 ≤ r ≤ m bits, where m is chosen to control a
trade-oﬀ between the required number of faulty results to achieve 1/2 chance of success (n/mlog2n),
and the amount of oﬄine search (2m).
The attack starts by collecting n/mlog2n faulty points. Then, starting from the least signiﬁcant
bit, the attacker attempts to inductively guess the bits of k by trying to ﬁnd a bit pattern of size
r ≤ m and a faulty point ˜ Q such that ˜ Q = −Q + 2Li(k). If a faulty point is found to work, then
the corresponding bit pattern is considered a good guess. Otherwise, it assumes that the least bit
is 0 and continues. Lastly, it checks the ﬁnal guess by computing kP, which should succeed with a
probability at least 1/2.
2.2.4 An Overview of Countermeasures for Fault Attacks
As discussed earlier, fault attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems can be divided into two classes,
namely, attacks using an invalid curve and attacks on the valid curve. In the ﬁrst class, there are
the attacks by Biehl, Meyer and M¨ uller [6], attacks by Ciet and Joye [9], and their variants. In the
second class, the only known attack to date is the sign-change attack by Bl¨ omer, Otto and Seifert
[7]. Here, we brieﬂy discuss the known countermeasures for these attacks and comment on their
eﬀectiveness and limitations.
1. Checksums: The use of checksums, like in error-correcting RAMs, helps in detecting errors
in data while stored or in transit, but can not be used to detect errors injected during the
computation. As such, they are not enough as a countermeasure against neither invalid-curve
attacks nor sign-change attacks.
11Algorithm 1 Right-to-left double-and-add-always SM algorithm with point validation and consis-
tency checking [3]
Input: P ∈ E(K), l = (ln−1,ln−2,ln−3,...,l0)
Output: lP
1: Q0 ← O, Q1 ← O, Q2 ← P,
2: for i = 0 to n − 1 do
3: Qli ← Qli + Q2
4: Q2 ← 2Q2
5: end for
6: if Q0 ∈ E(K) and Q1 ∈ E(K) and Q2 = Q0 + Q1 + P then
7: return Q1
8: else
9: return O
10: end if
2. Hardware and/or time redundancy: With redundancy in time or hardware, accompanied
by comparison, it is easier to detect faults since the attacker has to inject the same error
twice to pass the comparison test. In particular, hardware redundancy helps also in detecting
permanent faults in the computation block or the system parameters. The main disadvantage
of this solution is its cost, either in time or in hardware resources.
3. Point validation: The representation of elliptic curve points has some inherent information
redundancy that can be used to detect invalid points, i.e. points that do not belong to the
used curve. It follows that validating the input and output points can defeat invalid-curve
attacks. Moreover, point validation is a relatively cheap operation that requires only applying
the curve equation to the coordinates of the point to be checked. However, since the sign-
change attack does not attempt to move the point to an invalid curve, it cannot be countered
by point validation alone.
4. Scalar multiplication using Montgomery’s ladder: Since the Montgomery scalar multiplication
algorithm works using only the x-coordinates of points, it is naturally immune to the sign-
change fault attack. It is also immune to invalid curve attacks that use the y-coordinate.
However, Montgomery’s ladder is not enough by itself to counter a general invalid curve
attack that does not use the y-coordinate.
5. Randomized encoding: Randomization can be used in elliptic curve scalar multiplication in
a variety of ways while encoding the scalar, base point or curve parameters. For example,
splitting of the scalar k or adding a random point to the base point P can be used to mask
the faulty result of a sign-change fault attack, preventing the attacker from using it. However,
randomization does not help in countering invalid-curve attacks since its eﬀect will be reversed
by the decoding of the result.
6. Computation on a combined curve: This countermeasure, proposed in [7], combines time and
information redundancy, and is similar in principle to the use of a residue number system
to counter fault attacks, or to Shamir’s method to protect RSA systems [1]. Basically, a
smaller curve is chosen and the scalar multiplication is performed twice, once on the com-
bined curve and once on the smaller curve. Computation on a combined curve is an eﬀective
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fective against invalid-curve attacks [7]. Moreover, it requires signiﬁcantly more time than
consistency checking.
7. Consistency checking: Some algorithms involve built-in redundancy that allows for checking
the consistency of the results. For example, in Montgomery’s algorithm, the point Q and
H always satisfy Q = H + P. Another example is Algorithm 1, which is a right-to-left
double-and-add-always algorithm in which intermediate variables satisfy an invariant that
can be used to check for consistency. This invariant, combined with point validation, gives
resistance to both invalid-curve and sign-change fault attacks [3].
2.3 Fault Tolerance in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
Section 2.1.4 has outlined generic schemes for fault tolerance while Section 2.2.4 summarized the
known countermeasures speciﬁc to elliptic curve cryptosystems. In this section, we discuss designs
that use some of the known solutions and countermeasures to come up with fault-tolerant elliptic
curve scalar multiplication structures. We will look at traditional and recently proposed designs
[2] and evaluate them in terms of time and hardware overhead, probability of indicted errors, and
reliability.
2.3.1 Error Detection in Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
In the context of elliptic curve cryptosystems, error detection involves the detection of errors re-
sulting from both natural and artiﬁcial faults, whether transient or permanent, with a very low
probability of undetected errors. As discussed earlier, natural errors and most errors caused by
an attacker will move a point to an invalid curve, with the exception being errors caused by a
sign-change attack where the point stays on the original curve.
Known error detection solutions for elliptic curves employ information redundancy, hardware
redundancy, time redundancy or a combination thereof.
Information redundancy One of the simplest solutions, and the least expensive in terms of
overhead, is validating the resulting point before giving it as an output. Point validation (PV) can
be performed using the same ﬁeld arithmetic units used in the scalar multiplication operation, or
can be performed by an independent module, and takes around 80-200% of the time of an average
point operation depending on the ﬁeld and the implementation. PV does not protect against sign-
change attacks. For invalid curve attacks, Pr(undetected error)PV ≈ 1
q, where q is the order of the
underlying ﬁeld [2]. A more general approach, namely consistency checking (CC), can be employed
against all known types of errors resulting from fault attacks [2].
Hardware redundancy Another solution for error detection is simple hardware redundancy, i.e.
parallel computation (PC) with comparison. A straight forward DMR implementation of elliptic
curve scalar multiplication will detect an error when the resulting points from the two modules are
diﬀerent, e.g. caused by a permanent fault in one of the modules. However, for a sophisticated
attacker, it would be possible to inject the same fault in both modules to get the same errors at
the output. In this case, the structure will accept the corrupt result as valid.
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ways to encode the inputs of a scalar multiplication based on the properties of elliptic curves,
which enables the computation to be eﬀectively randomized. In [2], two encoding methods have
been chosen, namely, point randomization in projective coordinates and adding multiples of the
curve order to the scalar. These methods have been chosen since they require no output decoding
and due to their lower probability of undetected errors in experiments.
When input decoding is used, the computation is randomized and it is much more diﬃcult for
the attacker to inject faults in a way that causes the two modules to output the same faulty result.
As such, this structure can detect errors caused by natural faults, both transient and permanent,
and attacker-induced faults, even sign-change faults. The probability of undetected errors is much
lower for this structure, namely Pr(undetected error)PC ≈ 1
q2. While this structure takes almost
the same time as one scalar multiplication, its space requirements are doubled.
Time redundancy Re-computation is a straight forward application of time redundancy with
comparison. As before, simple re-computation (RC) can detect errors caused by transient faults
only when the two results are diﬀerent, and can not detect errors caused by permanent faults. An
advanced attacker can inject the same fault in the two runs and make the structure output a faulty
result.
Input encoding has also been applied to re-computation [2]. In this case, the structure will
be able to detect both transient and permanent natural errors due to the randomization of the
computation and since the same fault will have diﬀerent results. Also, it would be very diﬃcult
for the attacker to inject faults in a way that make the outputs both equal and faulty. As such,
this structure has the same probability of undetected errors as the parallel computation design, i.e.
Pr(undetected error)RC ≈ 1
q2. The hardware requirements of re-computation with input encoding
are the same as the conventional scalar multiplication, but the running time in this case is doubled.
A variant of this solution is proposed in [2] where, instead of full re-computation, only partial
re-computation is required. In this case, the result of the partial computation is compared to an
intermediate result in the complete one. Probability of undetected errors depends on fault type and
position but is generally low unless the attacker can speciﬁcally inject faults beyond the segment
that is used for comparison.
2.3.2 Fault Tolerance for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems
The use of error detection schemes is enough to protect a cryptosystem from both natural faults
and fault attacks. However, it may be beneﬁcial in some scenarios to generate the correct result
even in the presence of a fault. In this section, we review traditional and recent fault-tolerant
structures for elliptic curve scalar multiplication.
Triple modular redundancy (TMR) Triple modular redundancy with a majority vote works
well when faults are limited to one block, while when two or more blocks produce diﬀerent faulty
results, it can detect faults but cannot determine the correct result. However, an advanced attacker
can inject the same fault in two or more modules and make the structure output a faulty result.
As before, this has been solved in [2] with input encoding. The inputs of each of the modules are
encoded diﬀerently and the results are compared. In this case, the computations will be randomized
and similar faults will generate diﬀerent faulty results. The probability of undetected errors for
this structure is low, Pr(undetected error)TMR ≈ 3
q2, its running time is almost the same as a scalar
14multiplication, but the space requirements are tripled. Moreover, the reliability of a TMR structure
is RTMR = 3R2
ECSM−2R3
ECSM, where RECSM is the reliability of a stand-alone scalar multiplication
unit.
Dual modular redundancy with point validation (DMR-PV) [2] As the name indicates,
this is a simple replication with comparison scheme combined with point validation. The inputs to
each of the modules are encoded as before, and the results of each are tested by a point validation
module.
This structure can detect both natural-cause errors and errors caused by an invalid-curve fault
attack limited to one module, and detect them when they occur in both modules. However, this
structure can not always detect errors caused by sign-change faults since an attacker can inject
a sign-change fault in one of the modules and a random fault in the other, and in this case, the
structure will detect the error caused by the random fault and output the other faulty result as the
correct result.
For errors not caused by a sign-change fault attack, this structure has a relatively low proba-
bility of undetected errors, Pr(undetected error)DMR−PV ≈ 2
q. It requires similar time to a scalar
multiplication, but its hardware requirements are doubled. Moreover, the reliability of a DMR-PV
structure is RDMR−PV = 2RECSM − R2
ECSM.
Parallel computation and re-computation (PRC) [2] As before, this is a combination of
two types of redundancy, namely hardware redundancy and time redundancy with input encoding.
Two modules are used and their inputs are encoded, then their results are compared. If the results
are equal, one of them is given as the correct result. Otherwise, the computation is performed
again with diﬀerent input encoding for both modules and the new results are compared with the
old ones to ﬁnd the correct result.
This structure can recover from all errors limited to one of the modules and detect them when
they occur in both modules. Moreover, due to the randomized computations, it is very diﬃcult for
an attacker to inject faults in a way that generates equal faulty results. As such, this structure is
eﬀective against both invalid-curve and sign-change fault attacks.
This structure has a very low probability of undetected errors, Pr(undetected error)PRC ≈ 3
q2.
Its space requirements are double those of a scalar multiplication, and its time requirements can be
the same when no errors are detected, and doubled otherwise. Moreover, the reliability of a PRC
structure is similar to the DMR-PV structure, namely, RPRC = 2RECSM − R2
ECSM.
3 Frequent Validation for Eﬃcient Error Detection in ECC
As discussed in the previous section, error detection and fault tolerance for elliptic curve scalar
multiplication operation have been usually achieved by testing data for validity before and after
execution and randomizing the encoding of inputs, essentially treating the scalar multiplication
operation as a black-box. While this approach has its merits, particularly in that it minimizes the
modiﬁcations to existing scalar multiplication structures and the number of tests required, it has
the disadvantage of allowing an error to propagate corrupt ting all the following iterations until the
end of the scalar multiplication operation.
In this section, we propose the use of frequent validation as a more eﬃcient way to achieve
error detection in elliptic curve scalar multiplication. Instead of a single validity test at the end of
15the computation, intermediate results are tested so errors can be detected early. This modiﬁcation
has advantages in terms of both time and hardware requirements and the reliability of resulting
structures, as will be discussed later.
3.1 Fault Model and Assumptions
In this work, we deal with errors caused by transient faults that aﬀect iterative algorithms. In
particular, we assume that the iterative algorithm at hand satisﬁes two conditions:
1. The state of the algorithm, i.e. intermediate results, can be tested for validity.
2. The validity tests are relatively eﬃcient.
Faults considered here, whether induced naturally or by an attacker, are assumed to be transient.
Also, when a fault occurs anywhere in an iteration of the algorithm, we consider the whole iteration
faulty. Generally, an error caused by a fault will propagate to later iterations and the ﬁnal result
will be faulty. We assume that repeating the faulty iteration with the absence of the transient fault
would produce a correct result. An iteration can be either faulty or not, and we assume that all
iterations have the same probability of being faulty, p. In this context, frequent validation seeks to
discover errors in the computation as early as possible. When the goal is error detection, early error
discovery will prevent the waste (in time and power) of proceeding with the computation after an
error has occurred. When the goal is error recovery, it would be possible to recover from errors by
re-computing the faulty iterations. This way, we avoid repeating the whole computation, including
the non-faulty part.
Each iteration can be modeled as a Bernoulli experiment with a probability of being faulty p.
Let n denote the total number of iterations. For frequent validation, we divide the computations
into blocks of m iterations, and test the validity of the results after each block is computed. As
in the conventional reliability model, we assume that faults are statistically independent among
iterations. Then, the number of non-faulty iterations before observing the ﬁrst error, denoted by
X, will follow a geometric distribution. The probability of m consecutive iterations without an
error (i.e. of a successful block) can then be given by Pr(X ≥ m) = (1−p)m, while the probability
of an error or more in a block is the complement Pr(X < m) = 1 − (1 − p)m.
Let c(x) be the cost of computation in point operations for x iterations. (For the conventional
double-and-add algorithm, c(x) = 3x/2 point operations on average, while for 2-NAF double-and-
add algorithm, c(x) = 4x/3 on average.) Let cv be the cost of the test or the validation check that
can be used to detect the occurrence of a certain class of faults.
Relationship to the conventional reliability model The model we adopt here is related to
the conventional reliability model described in Section 2.1.3. In particular, a geometric distribution
with parameter p is the discrete analogue of an exponential distribution with parameter λ =
ln
￿
1
1−p
￿
[4]. Based on this relationship, Figure 9 illustrates the reliability associated with diﬀerent
iteration fault probabilities for an operation with 163 iterations, and clearly shows that the practical
region of iteration fault probabilities is p < 0.05.
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Figure 10: Error Detection by Frequent Validation
3.2 Error Detection with Frequent Validation
Error detection is generally achieved using a test at the end of the computation which is designed
to detect a certain type of errors, and these tests are usually eﬃcient. However, when an error
occurs, all computations performed after the occurrence of the error will be aﬀected, and performing
them becomes wasteful. This is signiﬁcant in terms of time, and in case of mobile devices, power
consumption.
So, it is important to design error detection structures in a way that is not only eﬃcient, but
also limits the wasted computations after the occurrence of an error. Our approach to solve this
problem is the use of frequent validation. The idea is to prevent error propagation using multiple
validation tests of intermediate results rather than a single test at the end, as illustrated in Figure
10. While this approach may slightly increase the cost of testing, this cost will be oﬀset by the
saving in iterations lost due to error propagation.
3.2.1 A Model for Error Detection with Frequent Validation
As mentioned earlier, frequent validation involves dividing iterations into blocks and performing
a validity test at the end of each block. Then, if only error detection is sought, the computation
17can be terminated when an error is detected. In this section, we analyze the cost of the increased
testing and the gain of preventing the execution of faulty computation following an error. We will
also show that the block size can be chosen to minimize the expected cost of wasteful computations.
Recall that n is the total number of iterations, m is the block size in iterations, p is the proba-
bility of an error in an iteration, and that iterations are assumed to be statistically independent. It
follows that the probability of having m consecutive successful iterations is Pr(X ≥ m) = (1−p)m,
so the probability of a faulty block (with one or more errors) is Pr(X < m) = 1 − (1 − p)m.
The random variable describing the number of non-faulty blocks needed to observe a faulty one,
denoted by Y , follows also a geometric distribution with mean E(Y ) = 1/(1−(1−p)m). However,
this expression of the mean takes into account an inﬁnite number of potential experiments, which
is not the case in our scenario since we have a ﬁnite number of blocks, namely n
m. Whenever an
error occurs after the n
m blocks, the whole computation is considered as a success rather than a
failure, and since the mass of the distribution beyond n
m is not considered for mean calculations,
the mean in this scenario would obviously be less than in the inﬁnite case.
To ﬁnd the expected value for a ﬁnite number of experiments, E n
m(Y ), which would be less
than the expected value for the inﬁnite case, 1/(1 − (1 − p)m), we ﬁnd the weighted average of all
the relevant outcomes, i.e. 1 through n
m, and normalize it by the cumulative distribution function
(CDF) of Y up to n
m trails to get
E n
m(Y ) =
P n
m
i=1 iPr(Y = i)
Pr(Y ≤ n
m)
where Pr(Y ≤ n
m) = 1 − ((1 − p)m)
n
m = 1 − (1 − p)n.
With this expected value, we can now analyze the cost and beneﬁt of the frequent validation
approach to error detection. By checking early for an error, our aim is to reduce the computation
performed after the error while adding the least overhead possible due to extra tests. There are
two cases to be considered: (i) no error or an error after the n
m blocks, or (ii) an error within the
n
m blocks. In each case we will estimate the cost of testing and the wasteful computation due to an
error.
In the ﬁrst case, namely no error or an error after n
m blocks, the number of tests would be
equal to the number of blocks, n
m, so their cost would be cv
n
m. Also, there would be no waste since
there was no error in the n
m blocks. The probability of this case is Pr(Y > n
m) = (1 − p)n. The
contribution of this case would then be Pr(Y > n
m)cv
n
m
In the second case, namely that an error happened within the n
m blocks, we observe that a test
is needed for each block until one is found faulty. So, the expected number of tests is equal to the
expected number of blocks needed to observe the ﬁrst error, E n
m(Y ). The expected cost of the tests
is then E n
m(Y )cv.
To estimate the wasted computation due to an error, we consider the faulty iteration and all
the following iterations until the error is detected, i.e. until the end of a block. In a block, the
number of iterations needed to observe a faulty one, X, follows a geometric distribution with an
expected value of 1/p. However, for the same reasons discussed earlier, the fact that the block has
a ﬁnite number of iterations reduces the expected value to
Em(X) =
Pm
k=1 kPr(X = k)
Pr(X ≤ m)
Figure 11 illustrates this for n = 163 and p = 0.01.
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The wasted iterations would be all the iterations after an error happened, which is m−Em(X).
Their cost is c(m−Em(X)). Hence, the total cost for this case would be E n
m(Y )cv+c(m−Em(X)).
The probability of this case is Pr(Y ≤ n
m) = 1 − (1 − p)n and its total contribution is Pr(Y ≤
n
m)(E n
m(Y )cv + c(m − Em(X))).
It follows that the expected total cost of error detection with frequent validation can be expressed
as follows.
Pr(Y >
n
m
)cv
n
m
+ Pr(Y ≤
n
m
)
￿
E n
m(Y )cv + c(m − Em(X))
￿
(1)
Given this expression, it is possible to choose the block size m in a way that minimizes the
expected cost, as will be illustrated in the examples in Section 3.2.2.
Parallel validation test In the analysis above, it has been assumed that the validation tests are
performed sequentially relative to the main computation. However, these tests can be performed
partially or completely in parallel, as illustrated in Figure 12. In the case of full parallelism, the
time overhead resulting from frequent validation tests would be eliminated at the cost of an increase
in the hardware requirements. On the other hand, partial parallelism can be achieved using the
idle cycles of the same subunits used for the scalar multiplication.
To model the total cost with full or partial parallel detection, we use a parameter α to measure
the amount of overlap between the scalar multiplication and the validation tests. When α = 0,
there is complete overlap, i.e. full parallelism, while when α = 1, the operations are completely
serial.
In the case of fully or partially parallel validation, the validation test is performed in parallel
with the main computation. If the test determines that the result is valid, the computation is not
interrupted. On the other hand, if the test detects an error in the result, the computation of the
current block is interrupted. It follows that for all non-faulty blocks, the cost of validation test is
αcv, while for faulty blocks, the cost is still cv.
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Hence, (1) can be modiﬁed to model fully and partially parallel tests by modifying the cost of
the tests associated with non-faulty blocks, except for the last block.
Pr(Y >
n
m
)αcv
n
m
+ Pr(Y ≤
n
m
)
￿
αcvE n
m(Y ) + c(m − Em(X))
￿
+ cv(1 − α) (2)
3.2.2 Error Detection with Frequent Validation in ECC
In this section, we discuss the use of frequent validation for error detection in elliptic curve scalar
multiplication. For the underlying curve, we will consider elliptic curves on a prime ﬁeld of size
n = 163. Also, we will use the conventional double-and-add algorithm as the reference algorithm
for scalar multiplication. These ideas are applicable to diﬀerent curves and scalar multiplication
algorithms.
Example 1: Detecting errors caused by invalid-curve and sign-change faults In this
example, we analyze the relative advantage of a scalar multiplication unit that performs error
detection with frequent validation. We base this design on Algorithm 1, proposed in [3] and
discussed in Section 2.2.4. This algorithm can detect errors resulting from both invalid-curve and
sign-change faults using a combination of point validation and consistency checking. It also has the
added beneﬁt of resisting timing and simple power-analysis attacks.
Algorithm 1 achieves its goal of detecting errors with a simple and eﬃcient test. However, if
we consider the fault model presented in Section 3.1, the expected number of iterations needed to
observe an error, En(X), can be considerably less than n. As an example, when the probability of
a fault in an iteration is p = 0.01, we get En(X) ≈ 60.7, while for p = 0.1, we get En(X) ≈ 10.
This illustrates that if an error can be detected early, time and power can be conserved instead of
being used to compute a faulty result. A suitable solution is to check the validity of the intermediate
values of Q0, Q1 and Q2 in blocks of size m iterations, where m is chosen to minimize the cost
expression given in (1). Algorithm 2 illustrates this approach. Note that in case an error is detected,
this algorithm returns the point at inﬁnity as an error signal. Other options are to raise an error
ﬂag or an exception condition.
To ﬁnd an optimal value of m, we note the following, keeping in mind that these values can be
tuned for a more accurate model:
• We assume that a point addition and a point doubling have the same cost, which is a common
assumption and is particularly true in the case of curves in the Edwards form.
20Algorithm 2 Scalar multiplication with frequent validation
Input: P ∈ E(K), l = (ln−1,ln−2,ln−3,...,l0), m ≤ n
Output: lP
1: Q0 ← O, Q1 ← O, Q2 ← P,
2: for i = 0 to n − 1 do
3: Qli ← Qli + Q2
4: Q2 ← 2Q2
5: if i mod m = 0 or i = n − 1 then ⊲ Performing the check for blocks of size m
6: if Q0  ∈ E(K) or Q1  ∈ E(K) or Q2  = Q0 + Q1 + P then
7: return O
8: end if
9: end if
10: end for
11: return Q1
Table 1: Cost of frequent validation for Example 1 in point operations
p Cost at m = 163 Optimal m Cost at optimal m Expected saving
0.1 310.5 6 15.2 95%
0.01 185.1 21 51.2 72%
0.001 98.4 56 88.8 9.7%
• Each iteration costs 2 point operations.
• The validation test in Algorithm 1 requires checking two points for validity and two point
additions. As such, the overall cost of testing is approximately four point operations.
Given these facts and assumptions, we can use (1) to ﬁnd the optimal block size for diﬀerent
probabilities of fault in iterations. In particular, we have cv = 4, n = 163, c(i) = 2i. Figure 13
illustrates the cost associated with diﬀerent values of m at diﬀerent probabilities of iteration fault,
p.
Table 1 shows some examples of the cost saving at diﬀerent values of p. In particular, the
second column states the expected cost, including the validation test and the lost iteration due to
errors, associated with a single test at the end of the computation. The third column gives the
optimal value of the block size m, while the fourth column gives the expected cost at this value of
m. Again, this cost includes all the validation tests and the iteration lost due to errors. The ﬁfth
column gives the expected saving due to the optimal choice of m.
We also ﬁnd the optimal block size and the expected cost for a wide range of iteration fault
probabilities, as illustrated in Figure 14. As expected, the optimal block size decreases as the
probability of fault increases. Moreover, because of the smaller block sizes, the cost at higher
probabilities of fault is not higher than the cost at lower probabilities. In other words, our method
succeeds in limiting the loss due to faults in a wide range of probabilities.
To compare with the reference case of a single test at the end of the computation, i.e. m = 163,
Figure 15 shows the expected and the worst-case cost of both methods. In this case, it is assumed
that the worst case is a fault in the ﬁrst iteration of the last block. It is clear that at a higher
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probabilities our method shows a signiﬁcant savings in both the expected and the worst-case cost
of detection. This is mainly due to the early detection of faults and the reduction of lost iterations.
Evaluation It can be seen from this example that the use of frequent validation for error detection
has a clear advantage over the straight-forward solution. In particular, the early detection reduces
the loss due to errors signiﬁcantly, and in turn, preserves time and reduces power consumption.
Moreover, due to the prevention of error propagation, even the worst-case performance is signif-
icantly better than the average case of the straight-forward solution for most values of iteration
fault probability
Comparing these results with the the structures in Section 2.3.1, we can see that frequent
validation reduces the required cost of error detection by reducing the time spent in computation
after the occurrence of an error. This eﬀect appears clearly in Figure 15.
4 Frequent Validation with Partial Re-computation for Eﬃcient
Error Recovery in ECC
Error recovery is achieved generally by various forms of redundancy. In particular, time redun-
dancy can be eﬀective against transient faults, while hardware redundancy is required to counter
permanent faults. Here, we focus on transient faults. In the case of time redundancy, the operation
is executed using the same hardware twice or more and the results are checked. When more than
two results are available, a majority scheme can be employed to choose the most probable result.
While this approach can be eﬀective against transient faults, its time overhead is high. It can
be readily observed that the reason behind this large overhead is the unnecessary repetition of
valid computations. We propose the use of frequent validation and partial re-computation as a
low-overhead form of time redundancy to achieve eﬃcient fault tolerance in ECSM. In particular,
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validation tests are employed at speciﬁc intervals to detect errors resulting from faults early and
recompute only the faulty parts without the need to repeat parts that were computed correctly, as
illustrated in Figure 16.
4.1 A Model for Frequent Validation with Partial Re-computation
As mentioned earlier, frequent validation involves dividing iterations into blocks and validating
the intermediate results at the end of each block. When an error is detected, only the faulty
block is re-computed and the results are tested again. In this section we analyze the cost of the
testing and the time overhead of re-computation in this approach. In this context, the overhead
includes all operations that are not part of the original scalar multiplication, i.e. validation tests,
re-computation and extra point operations. We will also show that the block size can be chosen in
a way that minimizes the expected overhead.
As stated in Section 3.1, n denotes the number of iterations, m denotes the block size in it-
erations, and the probability of an error in an iteration is denoted by p. Moreover, recall that
iterations are assumed to be statistically independent. As such, the probability of having m con-
secutive successful iterations is Pr(X ≥ m) = (1 − p)m, and the probability of a faulty block is
Pr(X < m) = 1 − (1 − p)m. To get the ﬁnal result, all n
m blocks should be fault-free. Moreover,
all faulty blocks have to be repeated, so the total number of blocks executed will depend on the
number of faulty blocks detected, but the number of non-faulty blocks will always be n
m.
The time overhead in this approach can be divided into two parts: (i) the overhead due to
block re-computations, and (ii) the overhead due to testing. We will discuss each one separately.
The time overhead due to block re-computation can be represented as the number of faulty
blocks encountered before observing the ( n
m)-th success. Blocks can be represented as Bernoulli
trails with probability of success (i.e. probability of one or more errors in the block) as deﬁned
above. To model this part of the time overhead, we recall the Negative Binomial distribution.
A negative binomial distribution with parameters r and p is the probability distribution of the
number of failed trails before observing the r-th success in a Bernoulli process with probability of
success p for each trail. It has the expected value of r(1/p−1). Thus, the number of faulty blocks
before observing the ( n
m)-th success, denoted by Z, will follow a negative binomial distribution with
parameters r = n
m and p = Pr(X ≥ m). The expected value of Z is
E(Z) =
n
m
(
1
Pr(X ≥ m)
− 1)
Since each of these blocks has m iterations, it follows that the time overhead due to repeated
blocks is c(n( 1
Pr(X≥m) − 1)).
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Figure 17: Fault tolerance by frequent validation and partial re-computation with parallel testing
The second part of the time overhead is the overhead due to testing. A test is needed for
every block, whether faulty or not. The expected total number of blocks is n
m
1
Pr(X≥m), so the time
overhead due to testing is cv
n
m
1
Pr(X≥m).
The total overhead can then be expressed as
c
￿
n
￿
1
Pr(X > m)
− 1
￿￿
+ cv
n
m
1
Pr(X > m)
(3)
With this expected overhead expression, it is possible to choose the block size m in a way
that minimizes the expected overhead of fault tolerance by frequent validation and partial re-
computation.
Parallel validation test The validation tests can be performed sequentially, as assumed above.
Another option is to perform them partially or fully in parallel, as illustrated in Figure 17, for a
signiﬁcant reduction in the time overhead. In particular, partial parallelism can be achieved without
a signiﬁcant increase in the hardware requirements using the idle cycles of the same subunits used
for the scalar multiplication.
Similar to the case of frequent validation, a parameter α is used to model the amount of overlap
between the scalar multiplication and the validation tests. When α = 0, there is complete overlap,
i.e. full parallelism, while when α = 1, the operations are completely disjoint.
In the case of full or partial parallel validation, the validation test is performed in parallel
with the main computation. If the test determines that the result is valid, the computation is not
interrupted. On the other hand, if the test detects an error in the result, the computation of the
current block is interrupted and the previous block is re-computed. It follows that for all non-faulty
blocks, the cost of validation test is αcv, while for faulty blocks, the cost is still cv.
Hence, (3) can be modiﬁed to model full and partial parallel tests by modifying the cost of the
tests associated with non-faulty blocks, except for the last block.
c
￿
n
￿
1
Pr(X > m)
− 1
￿￿
+ cv
￿
n
m
￿
1
Pr(X > m)
− 1
￿
+ α(
n
m
− 1) + 1
￿
(4)
Reliability As discussed earlier in Section 2.1.3, the reliability of a component is conventionally
deﬁned as R(t) = Pr(T > t), where T is the random variable representing the lifetime of the
25component and t is the time for which reliability is computed, which is usually taken to be the
whole time of the computation. In other words, the reliability is the probability that the component
will go through the computation without a fault. This deﬁnition of reliability does not apply directly
to our approach to fault tolerance, mainly because it was developed to model events of failures and
permanent faults [8]. In the case of transient faults, the computation will not necessarily fail when
a fault occurs, as it is possible to re-compute the faulty part.
We use a slightly diﬀerent, but essentially similar, deﬁnition of reliability. The reliability of a
partial re-computation structure is the probability that the system will produce the correct result
within a ﬁxed time threshold. This is essentially similar to the conventional deﬁnition since they
both measure the probability that the system will perform its function in a given time frame.
In addition to reliability calculations, the time threshold will solve another problem. It is
possible that the system will go on indeﬁnitely due to a permanent fault or a determined attacker,
so it is important to set a threshold after which the system would always stop and report a failure.
This threshold can be determined using the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of Z, the
number of faulty blocks before observing the ( n
m)-th success. A certain, usually high, value of the
CDF is chosen and the corresponding overhead is set as a threshold for the computation. This
threshold gives a trade-oﬀ between the component reliability and the tolerance overhead. For
example, for a reliability of 99%, we ﬁnd the value z of Z for which CDF(z) = 0.99. Then, the
threshold is set to the overhead associated with z. However, this only applies to transient faults
since no amount of re-computation can recover from permanent faults. As such, the reliability of
our method against permanent faults is the same as a stand-alone scalar multiplication unit. The
CDF(k) of a random variable that has a negative binomial distribution with parameter r and a
trail success probability p is computed as Ip(r,k + 1), where Ip(x,y) is the regularized incomplete
beta function computed as follows
Ip(x,y) =
x+y−1 X
j=x
(x + y − 1)!
j!(x + y − 1 − j)!
pj(1 − p)x+y−1−j (5)
4.2 Frequent Validation with Partial Re-computation in ECSM
In this approach, fault tolerance is achieved by employing an eﬃcient error detection scheme and
performing frequent validation tests. When a fault is detected in a block, the block is re-computed
and checked again. For a block size equal to n, this means repeating the whole scalar multiplication.
However, if smaller blocks are used, less re-computation is required.
Example 2: Fault tolerance with frequent validation and partial re-computation in
ECSM This example is analogous to Example 1 in Section 3.2.2. In this example, both types of
faults, namely, invalid-curve and sign-change faults, will be considered. As countermeasures, point
validation and consistency checking will be used as described Algorithm 3.
Following the same cost assumptions stated in Example 1 in Section 3.2.2, we can use the
expression in (3) to ﬁnd an optimal value of the block size m that minimizes the overhead. Figure
18 illustrates the overhead associated with diﬀerent block sizes and probabilities of iteration faults.
Table 2 summarizes the result for diﬀerent values of p. The second column gives the component
reliability associated with the probability of iteration fault, p, while the fourth and ﬁfth columns
give the overhead in terms of point operations and relative to a scalar multiplication with no error
26Algorithm 3 Scalar multiplication with frequent validation and partial re-computation
Input: P ∈ E(K), l = (ln−1,ln−2,ln−3,...,l0), , block size m
Output: lP
1: Q0 ← O, Q1 ← O, Q2 ← P
2: j ← 0, H0 ← Q0, H1 ← Q1, H2 ← Q2
3: for i = 0 to n − 1 do
4: Qli ← Qli + Q2
5: Q2 ← 2Q2
6: if i mod m = 0 or i = n − 1 then ⊲ perform the check for blocks of size m
7: if Q0 ∈ E(K) and Q1 ∈ E(K) and Q2 = Q0 + Q1 + P then
8: j ← i, H0 ← Q0, H1 ← Q1, H2 ← Q2 ⊲ store the current state
9: else
10: i ← j, Q0 ← H0, Q1 ← H1, Q2 ← H2 ⊲ restore the previous correct state
11: end if
12: end if
13: end for
14: return Q1
Table 2: Overhead of frequent validation and partial re-computation in point operations for Exam-
ple 2
p
Component
reliability
Optimal m
Overhead at optimal m Reliability,
optimal m point operations relative to SM
0.0001 98.3% 140 90.8 37.1% ∼100%
0.001 84.9% 44 111.7 45.6% 99.9%
0.01 19.6% 13 184.2 75.3% 76.1%
detection or fault tolerance, respectively. This means that all the tests and re-computations are
included in the overhead. The last column gives the reliability of the design using optimal m, which
corresponds to the least expected overhead.
It can be observed that, as expected, the optimal block is large for very low values of p while
for high probabilities of fault, smaller block sizes give much smaller overhead. Figure 19 shows the
optimal block size, m, and the expected overhead associated with diﬀerent values of p.
The cumulative distribution function can be used to measure the reliability of the structure.
Figure 20 shows the reliability of optimal block size at diﬀerent values of p. It can be seen that the
reliability never falls below 0.5, which is a property of the negative binomial distribution. When
higher reliability is required, a threshold that is higher than the expected value can be set such
that the CDF of that threshold is greater than or equal to the required reliability. A threshold also
helps in preventing inﬁnite loops.
Figure 21 shows the threshold associated with a reliability of 0.9 for diﬀerent values of p. It
illustrates that a reliability of 90% can be expected using less than 200% overhead for values
p < 0.05, which is a very high value of iteration fault probability as illustrated in Figure 9. This
is an indication of the advantage of partial re-computation in maintaining high reliability in an
unfavorable situation with a relatively small overhead.
An interesting observation from Figure 21 is the behavior of the gap between the expected
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Figure 18: Expected overhead of frequent validation and partial re-computation in Example 2
overhead at optimal m and the reliability threshold. This gap starts considerably large at low
values of p and shrinks as the value of p increases. The main reason for this behavior is that the
choice of the block size m takes into consideration only the expected overhead. It follows that, for
lower values of p, the chosen value of m is quite large, as illustrated in Figure 19. Large values of
m signiﬁcantly increase the reliability threshold since a block re-computation becomes expensive.
So, in order to reduce the expected cost of a highly-reliable structure, we propose to optimize
the value of m according to the reliability threshold rather than the expected overhead. This will
make a signiﬁcant diﬀerence only at lower values of p, as illustrated in Figure 22, which shows both
the overhead-optimized and the reliability-optimized values of m at diﬀerent values of p.
It is clear that the expected overhead of a reliability-optimized m would be higher than the
overhead-optimized m. However, the gain appears when considering the reliability thresholds of
both as illustrated in Figure 23.
4.3 Evaluation and Comparison
In this section, we evaluate the results of the preceding example and compare its results to the
structures outlined in Section 2.3.2.
Fault tolerance by partial re-computation can be classiﬁed as a limited time redundancy solution,
where only faulty blocks are recomputed. The eﬀect of the limited redundancy is clear in the low
expected cost reported in Example 2, even for relatively high probabilities of iteration fault. An
interesting observation is that the reliability of the structure does not drop below 0.5 as the iteration
fault probability increases, but the overhead grows much faster with higher values of probability of
iteration fault. However, we recall that the practical region of iteration fault probability is p < 0.05
as illustrated in Figure 9.
The allowed redundancy can be adjusted to satisfy certain reliability constraints at relatively
high probabilities of iteration fault. As illustrated in Figure 21, which shows the threshold associ-
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Figure 23: Expected overhead and reliability threshold for overhead-optimized and reliability-
optimized values of m in Example 2
ated with a reliability value of 90%, the required threshold is relatively low even at high probabilities
of iteration fault. This is due to frequent validation and the small block size. Also, at low prob-
abilities of iteration faults, where large block sizes signiﬁcantly increase the reliability threshold,
the block size can be chosen in a way that reduces the reliability threshold with a limited eﬀect on
expected overhead.
We will compare known solutions to examine the eﬀects of frequent validation with partial
re-computation on the performance and reliability of fault tolerance structures. The solutions
considered include triple-modular redundancy (TMR), double-modular redundancy with point val-
idation (DMR-PV) and parallel computation with re-computation (PRC), all of which have been
reviewed in Section 2.3.2. Also, we consider the structure in Example 2 in two variates, overhead-
optimized and reliability-optimized. All of these solutions are evaluated relative to a stand-alone
scalar multiplication with no error detection or fault tolerance capabilities.
Reliability We begin by comparing the structure reliability of each of the methods relative to the
reliability of the scalar multiplication unit. As Figure 24 illustrates, the reliability of conventional
redundancy schemes falls rapidly with the reliability of the scalar multiplication unit. However, the
reliability of the frequent validation with partial re-computation scheme does not fall as quickly.
This is caused mainly by the small block sizes at higher probabilities of fault and by the limited
re-computation of only the faulty blocks. Note that this reliability estimate is limited to transient
faults since re-computation can not help recover from permanent faults.
Time overhead We also compare the expected time overhead of various solutions. TMR and
DMR-PV are not included in this comparison because they are hardware redundancy schemes and
their time overhead is almost negligible. As Figure 25 illustrates, the expected time overhead of
all schemes grows with the probability of fault. However, when we examine the practical range
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Figure 24: Reliability of various schemes at diﬀerent values of p
of iteration fault probabilities, we can see that the expected time overhead of frequent validation
with partial re-computation scheme is better than other schemes based on full time redundancy.
Moreover, while the reliability of PRC falls rapidly with the increase in p, the structure in Example
2 maintains a reliability 90% with the reliability threshold.
Hardware overhead Schemes that depend on hardware redundancy, like TMR, DMR-PV and
PRC, have the advantage of tolerance to permanent faults. However, this comes at the cost of
doubling the hardware requirements in the case of DMR-PV and PRC, and tripling it for TMR.
On the other hand, schemes based on frequent validation with partial re-computation have no
signiﬁcant hardware overhead, and are only able to detect, but not tolerate, permanent faults. For
this reason, these schemes are optimal for environments where space is scarce and high reliability
is required.
4.4 Eﬀects of Frequent Validation on Security
The use of frequent validation in error detection and fault tolerance may introduce variability in
the timing of the operations, and a potential attacker may be able to gain some information. In
this section we discuss these eﬀects on the security of the considered operation.
If the time required to execute a cryptographic operation changes depending on the secret infor-
mation used in the computation, this variability can be exploited to discover the secret information
totally or partially. As such, it is essential to make the time taken by a cryptographic computa-
tion independent from any secret information. Many methods to achieve this have been already
proposed.
This approach to error detection and fault tolerance can be applied to both equal-time and
variable-time iterative computations. It introduces its own variability on top of the underlying
algorithm, since the time taken to abort the computation (in the case of error detection) or ﬁnish
320
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
0.0001 0.001 0.01
E
x
p
e
c
t
e
d
t
i
m
e
o
v
e
r
h
e
a
d
i
n
p
o
i
n
t
o
p
e
r
a
t
i
o
n
s
Probability of iteration fault, p
PRC
Ex2, overhead-optimized m
Ex2, threshold, reliability-optimized m
RC, 100% overhead
Figure 25: Expected time overhead of various schemes in point operations at diﬀerent values of p
it (in the cast of fault tolerance) is variable.
In the case of ﬁxed-time algorithms, the variability introduced by this approach will not under-
mine the security of the algorithm. This is due to the fact that all the variability introduced by
this approach is based on the frequency and positions of faults, and is independent from the secret
information.
In the case of variable-time algorithms, the underlying algorithm is already exposed to timing
attacks, and for the same argument above, this approach will not make it any easier for the attacker
to discover the secret information.
5 Conclusion
In this work, we have proposed the use of frequent validation in error detection and recover for
transient faults for elliptic curve scalar multiplication systems. Most previous proposals dealt with
the scalar multiplication as a black box and considered only testing the inputs/outputs for error
detection and time or space redundancy for fault tolerance.
In our approach, we divide the scalar multiplication iterations into blocks and we use simple and
eﬃcient error detection schemes to detect errors early and reduce the loss due to faults. Moreover,
we use the same error detection schemes with partial re-computation to achieve eﬃcient error
recovery without requiring complete time or hardware redundancy. The analysis and examples
given illustrate that the use of frequent validation is considerably more eﬃcient and reliable than
known error detection and fault tolerance schemes especially when faults are frequent or in the case
of fault attacks. Thus, for certain scenarios, the use of frequent validation in error detection and
fault tolerance may be a promising approach.
Some of the possible extensions of the work presented here include the use of input encoding and
randomization in the re-computation of faulty blocks and the eﬀect of existing hardware redundancy.
Another issue that might be of importance is the oﬀ-line choice of the block size which involves
33making assumptions about statistical properties of faults.
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